Europe United: Power Politics and the Making of the European Community by Rosato Sebastian

Author:Rosato, Sebastian
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 978-0-8014-6146-0
Publisher: Cornell University Press

Integration’s Discontents

Although integration was more attractive than establishing an in de pendent German military force, the French signed the Paris Treaty with grave reservations. President Vincent Auriol made this abundantly clear at the time, reminding his interlocutors that “signing is not ratifying.”163 France’s first concern was that the Germans might break out of the community at a later date. Because the EDC was an institution, there was nothing to stop the Federal Republic seceding from it and asserting national control over its military units and policy at a later date. In other words, the EDC was a fragile instrument for maintaining a favorable balance of power. The second problem was that joining the community would require the French to surrender their military autonomy. France would effectively cease to be a sovereign state. Try as they might, successive administrations were unable to resolve either the secession or the sovereignty issue, and the National Assembly failed to ratify the EDC treaty.

The French were painfully aware that West German membership in the EDC rested on a promise that, like all promises, could be broken. If the Federal Republic reneged on its commitments and broke the EDC rules, France would be confronted quite suddenly with a dangerous scenario: a powerful West German military.

Of course, no institution, not even the recently ratified ECSC, could prevent a state from breaking its promises, but the situation was more dangerous in the military realm. The French would be able to spot German defection from the coal and steel agreement, and it would take time for the Germans to ramp up industrial production and translate it into military might. As Schuman explained to Adenauer in May 1950, if the West Germans broke out of the heavy-industry agreement, the French would quickly become aware of their intentions and would have ample time to respond. “Rearmament,” he wrote, “always showed first in an increased production of coal, iron, and steel.” The ECSC would allow the French “to detect the first signs of rearmament,” and afford them the time to organize their response. As a result, the coal and steel pool had “an extraordinarily calming effect in France.”164

The situation was quite different in the military realm: a decision to defect from the EDC would almost immediately establish a German army and might place France in great peril. To be sure, the defense community agreement ensured there was no German general staff, thereby providing some reassurance. But the treaty also envisaged the creation of West German divisions, or “groupements,” which could be reorganized to form an in dependent German army.165 Moreover, by the terms of the treaty, Germany and France would contribute roughly the same number of troops to the European army. This even balance of power was important to France, as we have seen, but it also meant that the French would not possess the overwhelming military advantage required to control or coerce the Germans if they withdrew from the community. In other words, if the Federal Republic were to defect, France could suddenly be confronted by an autonomous military equal.

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